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Converting a Political Goal to Reality: The First 




In this article the author documents chronologically the initial steps taken by Mongolia to promote its initiative to turn its territory into a nuclear-weapon-free zone by having the General Assembly of the United Nations 
acknowledge and express support for such a status. This is not an analytical but a 
chronologically descriptive article that is based on the materials available to the 
Mongolian side only. It does not cover the discussions that the five nuclear-weap-
ons States (the P5)1  had when preparing responses to Mongolia’s various substan-
tive or procedural proposals, nor the discussions held in their capitals on either 
how to respond bilaterally to Mongolia’s suggestions or as P3 (US, UK and France) 
or P5.  As with achieving durable peace, establishing a credible nuclear-weapon-
free zone status is both a goal and a process. In this case the goal can be achieved 
through collective efforts and gradually. The process will continue until a viable 
status is established that would form part of an internationally agreed nuclear-
weapon-free regime. To achieve this goal close cooperation is needed.  The article 
will describe the Mongolian example of how multilateralism and mutual under-
standing are essential in addressing the challenges that the international commu-
nity is facing in this increasingly interdependent world. Competition, cooperation 
and compromise are the indispensable approaches and tools to address these and 
other international goals and challenges. When undertaking this chronology of 
the measures taken to have the General Assembly of the United Nations adopt in 
1998 its first resolution on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, the author, as 
still public servant, deliberately refrained from making in-depth analysis or value 
1 P5 means the nuclear-weapon states recognized by the NPT, i.e. the People’s Republic of China, 
France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
* This article is dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the Mongolian initiative. Time-wise it covers the first 
seven years that have laid the foundations for promoting the initiative towards its institutionalization. 
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judgments of the positions taken by Mongolia or the P5 separately or as a group 
with respect to the substance of the issues involved or procedures followed.   
The author was privileged to have served as the Mongolian counterpart in 
many meetings held either bilaterally with the P5 states or with the P5 as a group. 
At the initial stage, Mongolia’s main counterpart was the US Ambassador to Mon-
golia. When the issue was brought to the United Nations General Assembly in 
1997, the main counterpart was Ambassador John King, US delegate to the Con-
ference on Disarmament, who represented not only the US, but at times the P3 
and the P5. He spent enormous amount of time with the author to find possible 
ways and means to address Mongolia’s legitimate interests bearing in mind, of 
course, the interests of the US and the other P4. Numerous officials on both sides 
have participated in the discussions on how to promote the initiative and in the 
preparations of different drafts that in the end led to the adoption by the General 
Assembly of resolution 53/77 D on 4 December 1998. In order not to confuse the 
reader with many names, the author avoided putting various names and titles 
without detriment to the content of their statements and comments. 
As to the issue itself, it took Mongolia six years to have the General Assem-
bly welcome and support the initiative in the form of the first resolution entitled 
“Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status”. Although the 
issue appears on the General Assembly’s agenda every second year, not much 
progress has been made since 1998 to institutionalize the status.  
Brief timeline of 1992-1998 events 
1992 – President P. Ochirbat declares Mongolia’s territory a NWFZ and commits to work to have that status 
internationally guaranteed. 
1993 – Treaty on Friendly relations with Russia is signed whereby the latter commits to respect Mongolia’s policy 
of not admitting the deployment on and transit through its territory of foreign troops, nuclear and other weap-
ons of mass destruction
-US commends Mongolia’s policy and announces that “if Mongolia ever
faces a threat and decides to refer the matter to the United Nations Security  Council, the United States, along 
with other members of the Council, would consider appropriate steps to be taken.
1994-95 – Mongolia undertakes consultations with the five nuclear-weapon states  (P5) for a joint statement in 
support of Mongolia’s NWFZ
1996 – Mongolia explores the possibility of joining a future Central Asian NWFZ. 
1997 – Mongolia submits to the United Nations Disarmament Commission a working paper on the concept of 
establishing single-State NWFZs
-the United States, the United Kingdom and France (P3) make a joint demarche in connection with Mongolia’s 
plan to submit to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) a resolution in support of Mongolia’s initiative. 
The P3 consider it as “premature, unhelpful, possibly counter-productive” and urge it not to table any resolution 
in 1997 
-Agreement with the United States to postpone the draft resolution for a year and to work for a common under-
standing on how to proceed 
1998 – Mongolia consults with the P5 through the United States on a possible UN General 
Assembly  resolution regarding recognition of its NWFZ
-P3 make a 3-point proposal regarding Mongolia’s conventional security. 
Mongolia declines the ideas as not addressing its nuclear security concerns.
 -UNGA adopts resolution 53/77D entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status” 
that expresses support for Mongolia’s policy, decides to include the item on its agenda for 2000 and requests the 
Secretary General to report on its implementation. 
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As of this writing the status has not yet been defined internationally. Eleven 
years after the adoption of the first resolution, Russia and China have agreed, 
though reluctantly, to hold consultative meetings with Mongolia and to have a 
preliminary discussion of a draft trilateral treaty that the latter had presented to 
them in 2007. The P3 has also been invited to consider joining the discussion at 
some appropriate stage.  Although the goal has not been achieved, the process is 
continuing to find a mutually acceptable solution to this issue that can affect the 
balance of power and interests in North-East Asia.    
Putting the issue in an historical context 
The twentieth century history of Mongolia is a history of its efforts to preserve 
and strengthen the independence regained from the Manchu rule in 1911, to have 
that status recognized by its two immediate neighbors – Czarist Russia and the 
emerging Republican China. The 1915 trilateral Kiakhta agreement marked the 
first step in balancing the interests of Mongolia’s neighbors and at the same time 
providing conditional autonomy to Mongolia. In the early 1920’s, with the con-
solidation of Soviet rule in Russia, Mongolia became a Soviet satellite State. This 
had its advantages and disadvantages. The advantage was that having aligned itself 
with the rising Soviet State, it felt more secure from possible Chinese encroach-
ments on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 On the other hand, it had to toe the Soviet line both in internal politics 
and foreign policy, at times to the detriment of its own national interests. Of-
ficially, the former Soviet Union did not accept the concept of “national interest” 
of Mongolia. Its policy was based on the doctrine of class struggle and solidarity 
with the “working class” of the world, headed by the Soviet Union. Proceeding 
from that doctrine, Mongolia approached its security policy through the so-called 
class struggle principles: State security rather than national security was empha-
sized, which boiled down to the simplistic rule of defending “socialism” inside 
and outside of the country. The search for enemies inside Mongolia led to such 
“sacrifices” as annihilating a considerable number of its citizens as class enemies. 
The search for enemies outside of the country lead to cutting off its nascent trade 
and other ties with the US, Germany and other countries, and thus to isolating 
itself from the rest of the world except, of course, from the Soviet Union.
In the early post-World War II years, following the creation of the People’s 
Republic of China, Mongolia found itself surrounded by two communist States, 
which raised the hope for harmony and all-round cooperation among the three 
countries.  However, these hopes were dashed with the subsequent Sino-Soviet 
split by the end of 1950s. The seemingly ideological split by the mid-1960s grew 
into an overt interstate Sino-Soviet hostility. Unable to be ‘neutral’ in the con-
flict, Mongolia sided with the Soviet Union. Thus, from the 1960s to the end of 
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1980s Mongolia was victim of two prolonged and costly “cold wars”: East-West 
and Sino-Soviet.
In the East-West conflict, Mongolia firmly sided with the Soviets, including on 
the questions of international security, arms control and disarmament. In Janu-
ary 1966, it signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, 
which pledged, in Article 5 of the treaty, to assist Mongolia in case of an external 
attack. When the Sino-Soviet dispute acquired an interstate character by the mid-
1960s, both the Soviet Union and China had heavily fortified their common bor-
der. In 1967, the Soviet Union introduced its troops into Mongolia. Soon Mon-
golia’s two neighbors with numerically the strongest armies in the world (around 
4.7 million in China and 2.9 million in the Soviet Union) were confronting each 
other, with the Soviet Union having up to 52 divisions stationed in its eastern 
border regions, including 4 divisions in Mongolia. In its turn, China deployed al-
most 1 million men in the adjacent military regions of Sinkiang, Lanchou, Beijing 
and Shenyang.  While the dispute grew tense, the Soviets perfected their nuclear 
arsenal, and China, having successfully tested its nuclear weapon in 1964, began 
developing various types of nuclear weapons, from tactical to strategic. It is esti-
mated that in 1964 while the Soviet Union had 5.221 nuclear weapons China had 
deployed its first such weapon. 
At the height of Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969, when armed clashes occurred 
along some parts of their border, Moscow had around 10.538 and China already 
around 50 nuclear weapons2 . Moscow had around 60.000-75.000 troops, includ-
ing two tank and two motorized rifle divisions, plus unspecified air force units 
stationed in Mongolia. Some of the troops are thought to have been equipped 
with nuclear-capable intermediate range-ballistic missiles.
Having sided firmly with the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet dispute and having 
allowed the stationing of Soviet troops on its territory, Mongolia was no longer 
only a strategic buffer for the Soviets against China. It also served as a potential 
springboard from which the Soviets could launch a blitzkrieg-type military offen-
sive into northern China, if not into Beijing.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviets seemed to have been tempted to 
undertake a preemptive nuclear strike on Chinese nuclear installations. It there-
fore was no coincidence that Soviet military experts and strategists were writ-
ing at that time that “along with conventional war and instantaneous nuclear 
war of incredible magnitude and devastation, war involving the restricted use of 
nuclear weapons in one or more theaters of military operations should not be 
2 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010. Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists. July/August 2010. p. 81.  
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excluded.”3  It was also assumed that since China was the Soviet Union’s potential 
adversary, in case of a war between the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies 
on the one side, and the United States and also NATO on the other, a perceived 
second front,  i.e. between the Soviet Union and China, might  involve the use of 
nuclear weapons.4 Histories and memoirs of the political events in the late 1960s 
indicate that indeed at some time the Soviets entertained the idea of the possi-
bility of preemptively striking against the fledgling Chinese nuclear arsenal and 
facilities. This is confirmed by the post-cold war writings of US, Russia and even 
Chinese statesmen and scholars such as former US Secretary of State Dr. Henry 
Kissinger, former Soviet Ambassador to US Anatoly Dobrynin, Chinese scholar 
Liu Chenshan5  and others. Thus, Liu Chenshan published a study in May of 2010 
which recounts five instances in the early history of the PRC when it was threat-
ened by nuclear weapons. In his article Mr. Chenshan underlines that the most 
serious threat was in 1969 at the height of the Sino-Soviet border dispute and 
clashes that claimed the lives of around 1000 military personnel. According to Dr. 
Kissinger, the Soviets had approached the U.S. to ‘sound out’ the US reaction in 
case the Soviet Union were to make a ‘surgical’ strike against the Chinese nuclear 
arsenal. Soviet Ambassador to US, A. Dobrynin, wrote that he had told the Soviet 
leader L. Brezhnev at that time that the US response to the Soviet “sounding” 
was negative and that the US had warned that if China suffered a nuclear attack 
it would be considered as the start of the third world war. It seems that the US 
geopolitical calculation was that since it perceived a greater threat from the So-
viet Union than from the PRC, it thought that a stronger China would counter-
balance Soviet power. Had the US indicated that it would remain ‘neutral’ to a 
Soviet surgical strike, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis would have been a footnote 
compared to possible Sino-Soviet clashes.  
Since Mongolia was considered an important bastion of socialism in Asia, its 
territory was expected to play a strategic role in a potential Sino-Soviet confron-
tation or war.  However, the nature of the Soviet-Mongolian “alliance” and of the 
Brezhnev doctrine in general meant that the ultimate decision to use force, includ-
ing perhaps nuclear weapons, would have been taken by the Soviets themselves, 
without real consultation with the Mongolian side.  The latter probably would 
have been informed of the decision  ex post facto.  In other words, the Mongolians 
would not have had a voice in the decision to use force from Mongolian territory. 
Therefore, its role as a ‘strategic bridgehead’ in the potential conflict meant that 
in case of a conflict, Mongolia would have surely been turned into a battlefield, 
perhaps even with the use of nuclear weapons.
3 V. Sokolovsky  and  M. Cherednichenko  “Voyennaya strategiya i yeye problemy”  (Military strategy and its 
problems).  Voyennaya mysl’,  No. 10, 1968.  p. 36
4 see  Voyenniy entsiklopedicheskii slovar’  ( Military encyclopedic dictionary),  Moscow, Sovyetskaya entsik-
lopediya.  1983.  p.842. This concept of “limited” nuclear war was later abandoned by the Soviet military theory 
once the practical impossibility of containing nuclear war within predetermined bounds was recognized. 
5 Chenshan
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New realities, policies and opportunities
The Soviet agreement in the late 1980s to withdraw its forces from Afghani-
stan and Mongolia, as well as to ensure withdrawal of Soviet-backed Vietnamese 
forces from Cambodia opened the way for normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. 
The subsequent end of the East-West and Sino-Soviet cold wars, the disintegra-
tion of the so-called socialist world and of the Soviet Union itself have fundamen-
tally changed Mongolia’s geopolitical environment. These changes have opened 
up the opportunity to abandon its one-sided pro-Soviet policies, and, for the first 
time in three hundred years, to define and pursue its own national interests and 
priorities, bearing also in mind the vital interests of its neighbors.
In this new geostrategic environment, Mongolia abandoned its reliance on 
one state for its security and promote ideologically oriented domestic and for-
eign policies, and adopted a “multi-pillared” foreign policy, hence diversifying 
its foreign relations beyond its immediate neighbors. This major pragmatic turn 
found its reflection in the “Concept of Foreign Policy of Mongolia”, adopted by 
the State Great Khural (the Parliament) of Mongolia in June 1994. The concept 
thus declared that Mongolia’s foreign policy would henceforth be based on politi-
cal realism, non-alignment and pursuit of its own national interests as reflected 
in the 1992 Constitution, and that its priority would be to safeguard its security 
and vital national interests primarily by political and diplomatic means. While 
championing its national interests, it pledged to respect the legitimate interests 
of its neighbours and partners. Mongolia’s national security concept defined dis-
putes and conflicts between the neighbouring states as potential threats to its se-
curity and declared that ensuring the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia at 
the international level was an important element of strengthening the country’s 
security by political means .6
Mongolia declares its territory a NWFZ (1992)
Bearing in mind the importance of ensuring national security by political and 
legal means, President Ochirbat, when making a statement in the general debate 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1992, announced 
that Mongolia was declaring its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone and would 
be working to have that status “internationally guaranteed”. At that time the dec-
laration (i.e. the initiative) did not have a sensational effect in Mongolia nor in-
ternationally. It was seen, naturally, as one of the declarations of Heads of State 
addressing the General Assembly. 
A few months later ensuring the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia 
found recognition and reflection in Mongolia’s treaty on friendly relations and 
cooperation signed in January 1993 with the Russian Federation, in which the 
6 See The Concept of National Security of Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar, 1999.  Paras. 21.10 and 23.5 of the concept.
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Russian Federation pledged to respect Mongolia’s policy of not permitting the de-
ployment on and transit through its territory of foreign troops, nuclear and other 
weapons of mass destruction7 . That was the first concrete expression of support 
of Mongolia’s initiative by its northern neighbour. 
However, a concrete work plan to promote the idea of Mongolia’s NWFZ and 
to work for its realization came later, when the international community started 
to prepare for the 1995 review conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT).  The United States and the other four nuclear-
weapons states were interested in having the treaty extended for an indefinite 
period, and hence needed the support of other states, especially of non-nuclear 
weapons States Party to the NPT. Mongolia decided to use this interest of the P5 
to put its initiative on the ‘negotiating’ agenda with them, since it believed that 
recognition and institutionalization  of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status 
(i.e. making it an official process but not necessarily setting up of a special body 
or organization) would not only be an important regional confidence-building 
measure, but also a conflict prevention and even an early-warning measure, since 
no one can forecast with certainty that history would not repeat itself under situ-
ations which would be somewhat different yet in essence similar to those in 1969 
mentioned earlier. 
Quest for the P5 support  (1993-1995)   
In early 1993 the United States approached Mongolia, as it did many other 
non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, with a request to support the in-
definite extension of the treaty. The Mongolian side, mindful of the Mongolian 
President’s initiative, in return requested the United States to express its support 
for the initiative. 
Following the first meeting on this issue on 7 May 1993, the Executive Sec-
retary of Mongolia’s National Security Council met with the US Ambassador to 
Mongolia J. Lake and proposed a draft of a possible US Statement in connec-
tion with the Mongolian President’s initiative. The draft would say that at the 
time when the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation was persisting, the United 
States fully supported Mongolia’s non-nuclear policy and was prepared to assist 
in its implementation. It would also say that the US was also prepared to consult 
and work with the Mongolian side on the issue of promoting Mongolia’s security 
interests.
The US response came on 22 June. Having considered Mongolia’s request and 
the proposed draft, the US explained its basic position regarding NWFZs and 
Mongolia’s initiative. Thus, the US stated that it did not see a specific role for itself 
7 See Article 4 of the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Mongolia and the 
Russian Federation of 20 January, 1993.
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in implementing Mongolia’s proposed initiative, that by adhering closely to the 
letter and spirit of the NPT, Mongolia already benefited from the US commit-
ment to seek Security Council assistance for non-nuclear-weapons States Party 
to the NPT in the event of a nuclear attack on them as well as from its assurances 
that it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state not allied with 
a nuclear weapon state. He suggested that Mongolia could cite these existing US 
security guarantees or, if needed, the US could consider issuing a Statement us-
ing somewhat similar language. He said that the US did not wish to specifically 
endorse Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) for technical and legal 
reasons and that Mongolia’s announcement did not warrant security guarantees 
beyond the ones that US had already given to all non-nuclear states parties to the 
NPT. 
During the meeting on 22 June 1993 the US Ambassador pointed out that 
Mongolia did not in fact constitute a regional NWFZ and that even with respect 
to regional zones  the United States was selective when formally associating itself 
with such zones. Thus, for example, the United States had signed and ratified 
the protocols to the Tlatelolco treaty,8 but had not signed those to the Rarotonga 
treaty.9 Therefore any consideration of specific endorsement of a NWFZ would 
require a closer look at all the provisions regarding its establishment, including 
its relationship to the exercise of the rights recognized under international law 
such as the right of transit. That was why any consideration of formal endorse-
ment by the US of Mongolia’s NWFZ policy would require, at a minimum, a clear 
and detailed understanding of how the Government of Mongolia intended to 
implement it. However, the Ambassador noted, the US would have no objection 
if Mongolia would cite existing US security assurances under the NPT. Ambassa-
dor Lake then presented “points to draw on for possible publication”, for a careful 
consideration by the Mongolian side. 
The “points to draw on” would commend the decision to declare Mongolia a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone and welcome its decision to support the indefinite ex-
tension of the NPT in 1995. It would also state that Mongolia benefited from the 
US commitment to seek Security Council assistance for non-nuclear-weapons 
States Party to the NPT in the event of a nuclear attack on them as well as from 
US assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state 
not allied with a nuclear-weapon state. 
The Mongolian side, having listened to the US position on NWFZs in general, 
and on Mongolia’s initiative, and having had a cursory look at the “points to draw 
on” noted that it was difficult to comment off-hand on ‘the points”. The U.S. Am-
bassador suggested to take some time to study carefully the draft and to get back 
8 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of 1967. Later, in 1990 the scope of the 
treaty was expanded to cover the Caribbean countries as well.
9 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 1985.
 J. Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia)
26
Converting a Political Goal to Reality: 
The First Steps to Materialize Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon Free Status
to him with, if any, some possible amendments and proposals that in 
Mongolia’s view could be reflected in “the points to draw on” bearing in mind 
the general policy of the US on the issues concerning NWFZs outlined earlier.
Two days later the Mongolian side presented a somewhat re-drafted version of 
the “points to draw on” to the US Ambassador and explained the proposed chang-
es. Instead of providing positive and negative security assurances, the revised draft 
would say that Mongolia would …benefit from US commitments made unilater-
ally and together with other members of UNSC in 1968 with 
respect to non-nuclear weapon States Party to the NPT. It would also say that 
should a threat arise from a nuclear-weapon state to use force against Mongo-
lia, the US would be prepared to consult with Mongolia, with other members of 
UNSC, and to offer it political assistance or its mediation.
Soon thereafter, the United States proposed its own revised draft, which omit-
ted reference to Mongolia, and referred to a victim of nuclear weapon use. The 
gist of the draft stated the following: “Should a threat arise from a nuclear weapon 
State to use force against a non-nuclear weapon State, the United States would 
seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with 
the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon State Party to the NPT that is a victim of 
an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weap-
ons are used”. Since the draft failed to mention Mongolia by name, the Mongolian 
side was reluctant to discuss such a draft. 
Bearing in mind Mongolia’s reluctance, the United States proposed on 1 Octo-
ber another draft which followed US standard formulations on positive and nega-
tive security assurances and pointed out that these assurances were addressed to 
Mongolia as well, and that US noted that other nuclear-weapons states had pro-
vided similar assurances. As an inducement, it also proposed the following lan-
guage: “If Mongolia ever faces such a threat and decides to refer the matter to the 
United Nations Security Council, the United States, along with other members of 
the Council, would consider appropriate steps to be taken”.  The Mongolian side in 
principle agreed with such a Statement, however it proposed that the text should 
not refer only to “such a threat”, i.e. to nuclear threat, but to any threat, since it is 
the prerogative of UNSC to consider any threat to international peace and secu-
rity and limiting the Statement only to a “nuclear threat” would not be in keeping 
with the UN Charter. After some discussion and consultations with Washington, 
the US side agreed to such language. On 6 October, the US Department of State 
made the Statement (see Annex-1).
The US Statement opened the way for other P5 countries to express their sup-
port for Mongolia’s initiative. Thus on 22 October China welcomed and expressed 
support of Mongolia as a nuclear-weapon-free State, and declared that it would 
not only respect its policy of turning its territory into a NWFZ but also under-
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lined that China’s pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
NWFZs or states also applied to Mongolia. 
On 1 November, the United Kingdom made a Statement in which it said that 
the positive and negative security assurances that it was providing to all non-nu-
clear States Party to the NPT applied to Mongolia. For a state which was no longer 
in an alliance with any nuclear-weapon state and was trying to institutionalize in 
practice its single-state NWFZ status, it was unimaginable for the United King-
dom to threaten, let alone attack, Mongolia through either Russian or Chinese 
territory or air space. The UK’s statement of support was a good indicator that the 
P5 were supportive in general of Mongolia’s initiative and policy. 
In January 1994, France also made a Statement whereby it welcomed the deci-
sion of the Government of Mongolia to declare itself a NWFZ and announced 
that it was providing Mongolia with negative security assurances. With the French 
statement, all P5 had expressed their support for the initiative. Of the P5, the Rus-
sian Federation was the only one that had committed in treaty form to respect 
Mongolia’s policy. The other four nuclear-weapons states simply declared that the 
positive and negative security assurances that they had pledged to non-nuclear-
weapons states applied to Mongolia. However, amongst the five, only the United 
Sates had taken an extra step by declaring that if Mongolia ever faced a threat and 
decided to refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council, the United 
States, along with other members of the Council, would consider appropriate 
steps to be taken. Although by the end of January 1994 the P5 had officially  re-
acted positively to the initiative, Mongolia’s hope to have the status “internation-
ally guaranteed” was yet to be fulfilled.  
Quest for a joint P5 statement of support  (1994-95)
In order to take the first steps to have the status “internationally guaranteed” , 
in the Spring of 1994 Mongolia drafted a P5 Joint Statement (JS) regarding Mon-
golia’s declaration of its territory as a NWFZ that would declare that the P5 would 
respect its nuclear-weapon-free status, and that in case the status or Mongolia’s 
national security were to be threatened from outside and Mongolia decided to 
refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council, the P5 would take all nec-
essary measures for the Council to eliminate such a threat (see Annex-2). The first 
country consulted regarding the draft P5 JS was Russia, when the Executive Sec-
retary of the National Security Council of Mongolia paid an official visit to Russia 
in June 1994. The Russians offered minor technical changes to the proposed draft 
and in principle agreed to the text as a whole. Both Deputy Foreign Minister S. 
Lavrov and Secretary of Russian National Security Council O. Lobov agreed to 
support Mongolia’s efforts.
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Having obtained Russia’s support, the next step was to get a reaction to the 
draft P5 JS from the United States. Its Ambassador to Mongolia, after having con-
sulted with Washington, declared that the United States was prepared to look at 
the issue positively if it were to be officially presented to the United States. At the 
same time he cautioned that the JS should not go beyond the US Statement of 
October 1993 and that the US would not take any initiative to have the issue dis-
cussed among the P5, meaning that it would be up to Mongolia itself to approach 
each one of the P5 with the proposal. As a follow-up on US Ambassador’s sugges-
tion, Mongolia officially asked the US to consider the content of the draft JS. In 
response to the official request, the US reiterated its position outlined earlier and 
said that it would first and foremost look into the language to make sure that it 
was in accord with its NWFZ policy and did not go beyond standard US security 
guarantees provided to non-nuclear weapons states. Having examined the draft, 
in August 1994 the US proposed to replace the language concerning the “threat 
to Mongolian status or national security” by a language reflected in its 1993 US 
Statement and to add an emphasis that the appropriate steps to be taken would be 
“as provided in the UN Charter”. 
Having obtained the agreement, if not outright support, of Russia and the Unit-
ed States, Mongolia presented the draft to the P4 Ambassadors in Ulaanbaatar at 
the end of August.10  The first reaction came from Russia, which stated that it had 
no objection to the text even with the US amendment and advised Mongolia to 
obtain responses from the UK, France and China, and that if all agreed, the text 
could be finalized in New York at a meeting of the P5 and Mongolia, and could be 
circulated as a document of the Security Council. Russia emphasized that since 
the issue concerned exclusively the P5 and Mongolia, there was no need to have 
consultations with the non-permanent members of the Council. 
The Chinese reaction to the draft JS was also swift.  It pointed out that it sup-
ported Mongolia’s initiative to have a P5 JS and would carefully study the text. At 
the same time it advised Mongolia to work closely with the other P4. 
The United Kingdom enquired as to why the text in paragraph 5 did not have 
the adjective “nuclear” when qualifying the threat and whether the JS would set a 
precedent. Mongolia’s response to the first question was that since the paragraph 
dealt with the prerogatives of the Security Council, it would not have been correct 
to limit its prerogative to only “nuclear” threats. Besides, Mongolia would more 
likely feel threatened by more traditional forms of threats and pressures rather 
than by nuclear weapons.   As to the second question, Mongolia explained that 
while it already had separate assurances from its neighbors, multilateral assur-
ances were more credible and would involve all the P5. It was pointed out that it 
would not be a carte blanche guarantee, and that it would be a political declara-
10 France at that time did not have an Embassy in Mongolia and the draft was transmitted through Mongolian 
Embassy in Paris.
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tion, not a legally binding commitment. It was explained that this would not mean 
that the Security Council or the P5 would do what Mongolia wanted them to do, 
nor that any of the P5 would be constrained in vetoing any decision. The UK 
representative said that in principle the United Kingdom had no objection if the 
other P4 would support it. It recommended that the issue be pursued in New York 
through the United Nations.
Encouraged by Russia’s somewhat positive reaction, Mongolia asked it to 
organize P5 consultations with Mongolia in New York to promote the idea of 
the JS.  However, no concrete response was received to this request. Among the 
somewhat positive responses  from the other P4, the French response was very 
important. However, as expected, it was more elusive than that of the others. Its 
Ambassador to Mongolia indicated that the main parties within the P5 were the 
United States and Russia, and that their support was crucial. When pressed about 
the French position, he said that it was difficult for France to agree with the JS,  
since it could mean that many of the Francophone countries would want security 
assurances from France and it would be difficult for his government to explain 
why it was prepared to provide security assurances to Mongolia but not to Fran-
cophone countries. 
During the meeting he advised Mongolia to pursue the issue not with indi-
vidual nuclear-weapons states but rather with the P5 as a group, perhaps at the 
United Nations. In order to preempt any pretext for not supporting the JS (since 
the French approach to NWFZs was more restricted than those of the others due 
to their testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific) Mongolia specifically 
pointed out that what it was after was not a legally binding commitment that 
would firmly commit the P5 or a security assurance that had been provided by 
the P4 to Ukraine, Belarus or Kazakhstan, but rather a political declaration.  It was 
also pointed out that the provision that the “Security Council…would consider 
appropriate steps to be taken” was not meant to give Mongolia a carte blanche 
but rather referred to the steps that could be taken within the UN Charter and 
accepted Security Council procedures. 
The French did not respond until a few months later. In its response it ex-
plained that France was reviewing its policy regarding nuclear security assurances 
prior to the NPT Review Conference in 1995, which would most probably last 
until the end of the Presidential elections to be held in May 1995, and that it would 
also be difficult for France to adopt a positive attitude towards the JS when it was 
conducting nuclear-weapon tests in the South Pacific. That was the reason why, 
according to the French Ambassador, France had to make Statements separate 
from United States, United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, in the cases 
of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Just prior to the NPT Review Conference, 
France indeed joined the P4 in making a Joint Statement with respect to security 
 J. Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia)
30
Converting a Political Goal to Reality: 
The First Steps to Materialize Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon Free Status
assurances for non-nuclear-weapons states. 
In November, when discussing how the draft JS text could be improved, the US 
signaled that it could add a phrase in the JS to the effect that the P5 “commended 
Mongolia for its decision to declare a NWFZ” if the JS could be agreed and ad-
opted by the P5. That was a nice gesture on the part of the United States.
In December 1994, Russia signaled that although in principle it was not object-
ing to the draft JS text, it would be ready to make such a statement with respect 
to the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia if other nuclear-weapons states 
would do the same. 
The NPT Review Conference was held in May 1995. A month earlier, in order 
to get broader support from the non-nuclear-weapons States Parties to the NPT, 
the US, Russia, UK and France individually made declarations providing both 
positive and negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States Par-
ties, which in April 1995 was reflected in UN Security Council resolution 984.  For 
its part, China reiterated that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or 
under any circumstances. After the NPT conference, the pressure on the P5 had 
visibly diminished, and with it the chances of having the P5 JS also diminished.
After having waited for some time for the French review of its policy with 
regard to nuclear security assurances and its Presidential elections, in September 
1995 the Executive Secretary of the Mongolian National Security Council made 
a working visit to Paris to meet with the officials that dealt with nuclear policy 
issues, including the advisor to the Prime Minister and officials of the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since there was a sense that there was inadequate 
understanding of Mongolia’s position, the Executive Secretary explained in detail 
the rationale behind the JS. However, he was not able to convince the French, who 
announced that they could not support the JS. Thus, the P5 JS issue was officially 
blocked and a new approach to promoting the initiative was needed.  
A multilateral approach to promoting the initiative (1995)
Given the general reluctance of the P5 to support a JS on Mongolia’s NWFZ as 
expressed by the French response, Mongolia decided to broaden its approach to 
promoting its initiative and to enlist the support of other states. It turned to the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which in October 1995 held its XI Summit in 
Cartagena, Colombia. Mongolia’s initiative was positively received, and the Final 
Document of the NAM Summit welcomed the unilateral declaration by Mongolia 
of its territory as a nuclear-weapon-free zone as “a commendable contribution to 
regional stability and confidence building”. This was a Statement of Heads of State 
and Government of over 110 countries and hence gave strong political support 
and inspiration to Mongolia to promote further its  initiative. The first step in 
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multilateralizing the promotion of the initiative had been made. 
Decision to go to UN General Assembly to legitimize the status  (1995)
By the end of 1995, Mongolia decided that the most appropriate multilateral 
forum for promoting and legitimizing its NWFZ status would be the United Na-
tions General Assembly, the overwhelming majority of whose membership was 
non-nuclear-weapon states that were demanding negative security assurances 
from the P5, and some of which were working to establish NWFZs in their part of 
the world. Although Mongolia’s main negotiating partners would still be the P5, 
including its two immediate neighbors, the broad approach, it was thought, would 
provide Mongolia with greater political leverage and a political tool to promote 
further its initiative. According to the universally agreed definition of NWFZs, as 
approved by UNGA resolution 3472 (XXX) of 1974, acceptance by the latter was 
one of the important criteria for an arrangement to be considere as a NWFZ.11 
While Mongolia’s NWFZ did not fit into the traditional definition of a NWFZ, 
since it was acting on its own and not in concert with other states of the region, 
this did not discourage it from trying to break new ground both in the theory and 
practice of establishing NWFZs.12   
When bringing this issue to the General Assembly, it was decided that Mongo-
lia should not limit itself to a mere Statement or a declaration, as was the case with 
the P5 JS, but should instead aim for a novel yet full-fledged NWFZ status with 
legally binding security assurances from the P5 and institutionalized internation-
ally. Mongolia was not in a desperate rush, since the relations among the P5 and 
especially between Mongolia and its immediate neighbors were good and thus 
there was no imminent threat to its security. Mongolia could afford to promote 
the initiative slowly, step by step. Promoting a NWFZ was both a goal and a pro-
cess. It was decided to put formally the issue on the Assembly’s agenda and work 
for the latter’s formal approval of the status. Also at that time Mongolia saw a good 
opportunity to press its case in the United Nations Disarmament Commission 
(UNDC), a subsidiary body of the General Assembly that, in 1997 was planning 
draft guidelines for establishing new NWFZs.  
 The ministerial meeting of NAM, held in New Delhi in April 1997, ac-
11 The General Assembly resolution partly read as follows: A “nuclear-weapon-free zone” shall, as a general 
rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which 
any group of states, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention 
whereby”
(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the proce-
dure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;
     (b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the 
obligations deriving from that statute.”
12 The same UNGA definition of NWFZs regarding the scope of the definition specifically underlined that it in 
no way impaired the resolutions which the General Assembly has adopted or may adopt with regard to specific 
cases of nuclear-weapon-free zones nor the rights emanating from the Member States  from such resolutions.
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knowledged and welcomed Mongolia’s efforts to institutionalize its status as a 
NWFZ. Multilateral support for the initiative was increasing, which assured 
broad, if not unanimous, support at the United Nations General Assembly.
a) promoting the concept of a single-State NWFZ in the UNDC (1997-99)
An appropriate international forum for focusing on NWFZ issues and espe-
cially clarifying the position of Russia and China regarding Mongolia’s initiative 
as well as its possible participation in a future Central Asian NWFZ was the First 
Committee of the General Assembly that considered issues of disarmament and 
international security. Thus, in 1996 Mongolia, together with Kyrgyzstan, drafted 
and circulated a resolution13  whereby the General Assembly would welcome the 
intention of the States of Central Asia to establish a NWFZ, commend Central 
Asian States that had declared their territories a NWFZ (in this case implicitly 
meaning Mongolia) and called upon the P5 and other States to support the idea 
of a single-state NWFZ zone, extend the necessary cooperation and refrain from 
any action that would go contrary to the spirit of that objective. 
The reaction of the P5 to the draft resolution was lukewarm, while the other 
Central Asian States “needed instructions from their capitals” to decide on the 
possible co-sponsorship of the resolution. The lukewarm reaction of the P5 indi-
cated that Mongolia’s participation in a Central Asian NWFZ would not be whole-
heartedly supported. To clarify further the position of its immediate neighbors 
that mattered most, Mongolia approached Russia and China on this issue. Both 
of them immediately let Mongolia know that they would have difficulties in see-
ing Mongolia included in any possible future Central Asian NWFZ, since it did 
not border on any Central Asian State, and that about 50 km of Russian territory 
would have to be included in the NWFZ if Mongolia were to be a part of that 
zone, to which Russia would not agree. China also indicated its reluctance in see-
ing Mongolia as part of a NWFZ that did not have the support of Russia. With 
Russian and Chinese positions clarified, Mongolia was ready to promote the novel 
idea of a single-State NWFZ based on the UN comprehensive study on NWFZs of 
1975 and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution in 1976.14
      The first step in putting Mongolia’s issue on the agenda of UNGA was to pro-
pose that the issue of establishing a single-State NWFZ be discussed in the UNDC 
when it started drafting guidelines for establishing new NWFZ sin the spring of 
1997. With that in mind, on the second day of UNDC’s substantive session Mon-
13 See UNGA  document A/C.1/51/L.29 of 29 October 1996
14 Resolution “Comprehensive Study on the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects” was 
adopted on 10 December 1976 
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golia submitted a working paper15 formulating the concept of establishing single-
state NWFZs in cases where traditional (group) zones cannot be established. The 
working paper laid out the principles of establishing such zones, elements of a 
model agreement establishing such zones and the practical steps for considering 
single-state NWFZ guidelines in the UNDC that would coincide with the consid-
eration of the guidelines for establishing new NWFZs16 . To give some ‘incentive’ 
for discussion of this concept, the working paper also reproduced the commit-
ments made by the nuclear-weapons states in connection with 
Mongolia’s declaration of its territory as a NWFZ, as evidence of acceptance in 
principle of the notion of single-state zones. 
As expected, many developing countries, in line with the NAM’s earlier state-
ments on the issue, welcomed this new angle of approaching the establishment of 
NWFZs, agreeing with Mongolia that life was rich in diversity and that the cases 
of individual states needed to be also addressed, which is foreseen and mentioned 
in the 1975 comprehensive study of the United Nations of the NWFZs in all their 
aspects. However, the P5, which were important actors and factors in making 
NWFZs effective, were silent. 
When some developing countries began making reference to Mongolia’s pro-
posal during the general debate, the representatives of the P5 approached the 
Mongolian delegation to say that since Mongolia was an exceptional case, it would 
not be proper to have the concept of single-state zones considered together with 
establishing traditional zones and that, frankly speaking, the P5 needed time to 
carefully study the single-state concept and its implications for existing security 
arrangements. Mongolia’s reply was that although it would not push too much for 
an immediate consideration of the issue in the UNDC, nevertheless the cases of 
individual states could not be ignored. During the consideration of establishing 
new NWFZs, the representatives of some developing countries, including Nepal 
and Afghanistan, displayed great interested in the issue. However, in the final text 
of the UNDC’s guidelines, agreed upon in 1999, Mongolia was unable to have any 
reference to the concept of a single-state NWFZs reflected, due to the reluctance 
of the P5 and the application of the rule of consensus when adopting the text of 
these guidelines.  At that time Mongolia did not want to be seen as abusing the 
consensus rule for its own benefit. However, on its insistence a footnote to the 
guidelines made reference to the initiative and stated that the status had been 
welcomed by the General Assembly in 1998.17 
15 See document A/CN/10/195 of 22 April 1997
16 See UNGA  document A/C.1/51/L.29 of 29 October 1996
17 See  Report of the Disarmament Commission. General Assembly Official Records. Fifty-fourth session. 
Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42). Foot note  “g” of the guidelines read as follows: Owing to its unique geographi-
cal circumstances, Mongolia has declared its nuclear-weapon-free status in order to promote its security. This 
status was welcomed by the General Assembly in its consensus resolution 53/77 D of 4 December 1998.
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The promotion of a novel concept of single-state NWFZs was not an easy task 
and  needed proper conditions for in-depth discussion. However, the practical 
establishment of one such zone would be useful in demonstrating its utility, feasi-
bility and importance. But Mongolia’s purpose in the General Assembly was not 
to promote the concept as an  abstract possibility, but to raise this issue first and 
foremost in the practical context of gaining the General Assembly’s recognition of 
Mongolia’s declared single-state NWFZ.
The 1975 United Nations comprehensive study of NWFZs had envisaged the 
possibility of the establishment of NWFZs in ‘individual countries’, while interna-
tional practice has de facto seen the establishment of single-state nuclear-weapon-
free zones in Latin America until the Tlatelolco treaty entered into force in Oc-
tober 2002.18 Long before the entry into force of the Tlatelolco treaty the P5 had 
ratified its Protocol II, thus de facto and de jure providing security assurances to 
individual States until the entry into force of the Treaty.19  Also in the Treaty on 
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany20   the two German states and the 
four nuclear-weapon states agreed that no foreign armed forces and no nuclear 
weapons or their carriers would be stationed in the German Democratic Republic 
or deployed there, thus de facto and de jure making it a single-state NWFZ.
  b) working for a separate UNGA resolution on Mongolia’s status  (1997-98)
In parallel to working through the UNDC to promote the concept of a single-
state NWFZ and without waiting for its outcome, Mongolia thought it important 
to have the issue considered by the General Assembly itself, preferably in the First 
Committee that dealt with disarmament and security issues. Before proceeding 
to work with the P5 representatives in the General Assembly on a resolution that 
would recognize Mongolia as a NWFZ, Mongolia needed to study the position 
of each nuclear-weapon State regarding NWFZs and, bearing that in mind, draft 
a paper that would contain the ideas that it would want to see in the future - ei-
ther in a traditional UNGA disarmament resolution or in a separate resolution. 
Although it would have been easier to add a paragraph in a generally accepted 
UNGA resolution on NWFZs or on regional security, it was thought that the pur-
pose would be better served if Mongolia would go for a separate resolution, since 
that would allow the international community to focus specifically on the issue 
without mixing it with other related issues.   
With that in mind, in the summer of 1997, Mongolia prepared a draft resolu-
18 The treaty specified that the full zone would not enter into force until it was ratified by all States within the 
zone. That did not occur until Cuba ratified the treaty in 2002. However, the treaty permitted individual States 
to waive that provision and declare themselves bound by the treaty, which many did beginning with Mexico in 
1968.
19 Thus the United Kingdom deposited its instrument of ratification of Protocol II in 1969, followed by the 
United States in 1971, China and France in 1974 and the Soviet Union in 1979.
20 Better known as the Two Plus Four Treaty.
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tion as a trial balloon, seeking the reactions of the P5. The draft in its preambular 
part made reference to the 1975 comprehensive UN study of the question of NW-
FZs in all its aspects, which had, inter alia, recognized the right of individual coun-
tries to establish NWFZs. In its operative part, the draft recognized and provided 
support for Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free-status and invited its neighbors and 
other nuclear weapons states to cooperate with Mongolia in institutionalizing this 
status.  It called upon states to respect and support Mongolia’s independence, sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity, and nuclear-weapon-free status and requested the 
Secretary-General and the relevant UN bodies to extend assistance to Mongolia 
in institutionalizing the status. The draft also requested the Secretary General to 
report on the implementation of the resolution at the subsequent session of the 
UN General Assembly and include in the agenda of the subsequent (fifty-third) 
session an item entitled “Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status”. 
The draft, as it turned out, presented many difficulties for the P3 (i.e. US, UK 
and France).  Thus, US Ambassador J. King, speaking also on behalf of UK and 
France, cautioned against using the term “zone”. He indicated that although such 
language had been used in some past statements, the terminology had acquired 
more sensitive legal connotations in light of the US signing of the protocols to the 
Rarotonga and Pelindaba treaties, as well as of the ongoing discussions on how to 
approach the Bangkok Treaty. That was why, he argued, more time was needed for 
P3 government legal experts to carefully study the issue. The P3 inquired about 
Mongolia’s real objectives: did it want a full status as a NWFZ with all the legal 
assurances and requirements that go with it; or guarantees for its territorial integ-
rity and freedom from aggression; or simply some sort of special recognition of 
its unique geographical status, since it bordered only with two nuclear-weapon 
states. The P3 also expressed concern regarding the notion of “institutionalizing 
the status” and therefore needed further clarification from the Mongolian side. 
Turning to the operative part of the draft, the US wondered about the role of the 
UN Secretary General and relevant United Nations bodies, which could have, in 
their view, important operational and financial implications. Bearing in mind all 
of the above questions and queries, and that there was little time to work on the 
necessary drafting changes which surely required consultations with Washington 
and the other P2 capitals, the US representative thought that it was impossible 
to do the necessary legal and political analysis in time to decide on instructions 
for the work of the First Committee in October-November 1997.  Ambassador J. 
King expressed the hope that Mongolia would not table the resolution during that 
session and cautioned that lack of support for the resolution by the P5 would un-
dermine the fundamental political objective that Mongolia was trying to achieve.
 The Mongolian delegation tried to respond to some of the issues raised. It 
pointed out that its objective and goal had been clearly reflected in the draft reso-
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lution itself, that it wanted an international recognition of its unique status as a 
state sandwiched between two nuclear-weapon states and wanted legally binding 
assurances from the P5 that they would not only respect the status of total absence 
of nuclear weapons on its territory, but would not do anything that would con-
tribute to the violation of that status. Being a land-locked country with limited 
access to the outside world, and limited economic leverage and political influence, 
Mongolia had usually found itself easily “influenced” by its giant neighbours in its 
dealings with the outside world. Mongolia’s independent foreign policy needed 
overall security assurances not only from Russia and China, but also from the 
other P3 since they were all permanent members of the Security Council and 
each one had a veto power on issues of international security. Since Mongolia had 
border treaties with its immediate neighbors and was enjoying good-neighborly 
relations with both of them, there was no need to have a guarantee for its territo-
rial integrity.  Mongolia then expressed its willingness to work on the actual draft-
ing of the resolution since, in its view, there was still ample time for such drafting 
work. Ambassador J. King pointed out that although the draft resolution did not 
make any reference to Mongolia in principle, in fact it was promoting the concept 
of a single-state NWFZ and that was not acceptable.  
Mongolia’s response was communicated by the United States to the other P4. 
The P5, having consulted among each other on Mongolia’s draft resolution and 
its response to the US suggestions, decided to signal their displeasure with Mon-
golia’s plans. Thus, on 9 October 1997 the P3, i.e. US, UK and France made joint 
demarches in Ulaanbaatar, Geneva and Moscow whereby they warned Mongolia 
that any attempt to go beyond its political declaration of 1992 (i.e. President P. 
Ochirbat’s declaration of Mongolia as a NWFZ) towards a legally-binding format 
would be seen as a departure from the recognized concept of NWFZs, and would 
raise difficult issues of principle which the P5 would need to consider very care-
fully. The P3 noted that Mongolia already benefited from the general security as-
surances of the P5 reflected in Security Council resolution 964 of 11 April 1995 
and that the P5 took those assurances very seriously. The gist of the demarche was 
to warn that tabling a resolution of the type that was being presented unofficial-
ly would be “premature, unhelpful and possibly counterproductive” and to urge 
Mongolia not to table it in the First Committee. When asked whether reference to 
P5 meant that Russia and China also were part of the demarche, the answer was 
that they were aware of the joint demarche but were not directly involved with the 
demarche itself.  
At that time both sides were determined to pursue their objectives. Mongolia 
thought that the chances of the adoption of the resolution by overwhelming ma-
jority in the First Committee were high and that is why it worked with the NAM 
countries to garner the widest possible support for the draft resolution. It thought 
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its cause was just and understandable for all, and that not only the P5 themselves 
supported in principle Mongolia’s initiative but also the NAM as a group was sup-
portive of Mongolia’s policy which was in line with the spirit of the earlier NAM 
pronouncements on the issue as well as the successfully negotiated Pelindaba and 
Bangkok treaties that established NWFZs in Africa and South-East Asia respec-
tively. 
Sensing possible complications regarding the draft resolution, the European 
Union took the initiative to try to help both sides to come to some agreement. 
Thus, Belgian delegate on behalf of the EU the Mongolian delegation and sug-
gested that the best way out might be not to press for a resolution at that session of 
the General Assembly with an understanding  that in the subsequent year the P5, 
the EU and others could agree to a separate resolution on Mongolia’s initiative. It 
was also suggested that perhaps Mongolia could think of promoting the initiative 
not as a “zone”, which the P5 were not prepared to accept, but rather in the vague 
form of a “status”. 
After having consulted with Ulaanbaatar, the Mongolian delegation agreed not 
to have a separate resolution at that session. It was agreed later with the US delega-
tion, which was now acting on behalf of all P5, that informal consultations would 
be needed before the next session of the Assembly and that one of the possible 
ways would be to have such consultations during the forthcoming session of the 
UNDC in the spring of 1998. The United States indicated that it was ready to meet 
with Mongolia separately to understand better the latter’s policy objectives behind 
the initiative. 
c) defining the scope and content of the first resolution  (1998)
After having agreed in 1997, in principle, to have the General Assembly adopt 
in 1998 a separate resolution on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, Mongo-
lia and the US (as agreed among the P5) held a number of informal meetings to 
better understand the position of each side and on that basis to try to come to an 
agreement on a possible UNGA resolution in the fall of 1998.
Thus, in December 1997, representatives of Mongolia and the US met on the 
margins of the signing Conference for the Landmines Convention held in Ottawa 
on 2-4 December and exchanged information on the positions of Mongolia and 
the P5 on the issue and how to proceed further. Although no concrete decision 
was taken during that meeting, both sides agreed that they should be creative and 
bear in mind the wider legitimate security interests of each side. 
In January 1998, the two sides met again in New York where they continued 
the work to better understand the interests of each other. The Mongolian side 
explained the main aims of its post-Cold War foreign policy and how it saw the 
challenges and opportunities of the emerging security environment. Thus, it was 
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underlined that its interest lay largely with ensuring the country’s external na-
tional security primarily by political and legal means, and that it did not foresee 
any nuclear or military threat from its neighbors. However, after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Mongolia, a vir-
tual security vacuum had emerged that could easily be filled by either of the two 
neighbors or by another great power if they thought this was warranted by their 
security ‘imperatives’ or ‘needs’. 
The dual goal of Mongolia was, it was pointed out, (1). to ensure that no great 
power would be allowed to use Mongolian territory inter alia for stationing nu-
clear weapons or parts of systems thereof to the detriment of the interests of other 
powers or of regional stability in general and (2) not being part of any political or 
military alliances, Mongolia was interested in having a well-defined and interna-
tionally agreed status that would include security assurances of the P5 tailored to 
Mongolia’s geopolitical location. 
The US side was interested in understanding further the political rationale be-
hind Mongolia’s initiative and the proposed resolution, in case there would be 
one. Doubt was raised as to whether a single State could be considered as a cred-
ible zone. The Mongolian side quoted the 1975 comprehensive study on NWFZs 
as the basis of its policy and of tacit international support. The US was also inter-
ested in the positions of Russia and China on the issue and, if a General Assembly 
resolution were to be adopted, what would Mongolia do after its adoption.  The 
Mongolian side said that its neighbours were well aware of Mongolia’s policy and 
in principle supported it, and that when the General Assembly adopts a separate 
resolution on the issue, that would allow Mongolia to work further to actually in-
stitutionalize the zone by concluding an international treaty to that effect. The US 
side left the meeting with the understanding that Mongolia’s preoccupation with 
its security was more of a political nature than military. It was also understood 
that Mongolia was looking beyond a resolution and nuclear security assurances 
to a wider political and legal assurances of the great powers. Both sides agreed to 
meet again before the UNDC session in 1998. 
On the margins of 1998 UNDC, as agreed, the Mongolian and US representa-
tives met to discuss the possible steps that could lead to the adoption of a General 
Assembly resolution on the issue. The Mongolian delegation came to the meeting 
with a non-paper in the form of a draft resolution regarding Mongolia’s nuclear-
weapon-free status to sound out the position of the P5 (see Annex-3). It was quite 
an ambitious draft (there was an understanding in the Mongolian delegation that 
an ambitious draft would cover most of the areas of Mongolia’s interest, enable it 
to sound out individual and collective reactions of the P5 to the issues raised and 
provide some room for diplomatic bargaining and agreement). In return, as an 
inducement, the draft referred to the issues as a nuclear-weapon-free status, and 
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not as a single-State zone. The author is reproducing in extenso the main provi-
sions of the draft resolution so as to show the areas of special interest of Mongolia. 
Mongolia’s ambitious draft resolution 
The draft had 12 preambular and 8 operative paras.  The preambular part 
for example, welcomed the decision of Mongolia, located between two nuclear-
weapon states, to declare its territory a NWFZ, noted with satisfaction the earlier 
separate Statements made by the P5 regarding Mongolia’s declaration, expressed 
the belief that the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia would contribute to 
enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region and promote Mongo-
lia’s security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
inviolability of its borders and preservation of its ecological balance . It would 
have expressed the conviction that for the nuclear-weapon-free status to be cred-
ible, the status needed to have a sound international legal basis and be verifiable. 
The operative part of the draft recognized and supported Mongolia’s nucle-
ar-weapon-free status, welcomed its good-neighborly and balanced relationship 
with its two neighbors, invited them and other nuclear-weapon states to cooper-
ate with Mongolia in institutionalizing the status and called upon Member States 
to respect and support its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, invio-
lability of its frontiers, preservation of its ecological balance and its non-aligned 
foreign policy. To make the resolution more effective, as in a draft presented in 
1997, it requested the Secretary General to assist Mongolia in institutionalizing 
the status, to report on the implementation of the resolution the subsequent year, 
and include in the provisional agenda of that subsequent session a separate item 
entitled “Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status”. 
Many provisions of this draft formed the basis of the first General Assembly 
resolution on the item. Since the UNODC session and bilateral meetings had 
shown that the P5 had difficulties in accepting a single-state NWFZ as a concept, 
the Mongolian side decided not to raise unnecessary difficulties from the begin-
ning of the process. Thus, it was decided not to use the word “zone” in the title of 
the draft but rather to use the ambiguous notion of “status”. The US representa-
tive took the draft and promised to share it with other P4 and get back with some 
feedback.
At the bilateral meeting both sides agreed that Mongolia’s security needed to 
be looked at from a broad angle, in line with Mongolia’s national security concept, 
and not only from a narrow strategic and military perspective. The US representa-
tive hinted that the P3 (US, UK and France) were working on a joint proposal to 
be made to Mongolia sometime in June, and that Russia and China were aware of 
that proposal and could, at some stage, even co-sponsor it. 
When the Mongolian delegate asked for some specifics of the planned P3 
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proposal, the US delegate said that it would amount to adopting a number of 
documents, including perhaps two General Assembly resolutions: one welcom-
ing Mongolia as a permanent neutral country and the second promoting greater 
cooperation and good-neighborliness in the region of Mongolia. Moreover, Mon-
golia might think of concluding a border security treaty with its neighbors like 
the one that Russia had concluded with China and its Central Asian neighbors. 
He also mentioned that the P3 were also thinking of proposing to Mongolia and 
China that they conclude a treaty whereby the latter would commit to respect 
Mongolia’s policy of prohibiting the stationing of nuclear and other weapons of 
mass destruction in Mongolia (as Russia had committed to in 1993 in its treaty 
with Mongolia). 
The Mongolian delegate promised that its side would carefully consider the 
proposals upon their formal presentation, but as of that moment he did not see 
valid reasons for Mongolia to abandon the policy of institutionalizing its nucle-
ar-weapon-free zone status and acquiring security assurances from the P5. The 
Mongolian representative said that the best and shortest way to address the issue 
of institutionalizing Mongolia’s status would be to adopt a substantive resolution 
in 1998 followed by conclusion of a trilateral treaty between Mongolia and its 
neighbors that would define Mongolia’s status and provide it with the assurances 
to which the other P3 could accede at some stage, as well as the adoption of a more 
or less procedural resolution by the General Assembly in 2000 that would seal and 
close the entire deal. The US representative cautioned not to force the single-state 
NWFZ issue21  and promised to consider carefully the proposals to be made in 
June 1998 in Geneva. Referring to its non-paper, the Mongolian representative 
said that it could be revised bearing in mind the outcome of the Geneva meeting 
and the meeting of Mongolian Foreign Minister’s council22   scheduled in August 
1998. 
d) P3 four-point proposal
At the June 1998 Geneva meeting of representatives of the US, UK, France 
and Mongolia, the P3 formally introduced their proposals which they believed 
could better achieve Mongolia’s fundamental objectives of international support 
for its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity than a formal recogni-
tion of Mongolia’s NWFZ through a UNGA resolution. They were of the view that 
a single-state NWFZ concept could raise difficulties for them and other states if 
applied under other circumstances. With this in mind the P3 proposed four ideas 
21 UNDC in its report on the work for 1997 pointed out that the issue of single-state NWFZ attracted the 
attention of the Commission, while its work for 1998 underlined the need to actively consider all aspects of the 
issue of establishing single-state NWFZ.
22 The Minister’s council consists of the Minister and some other senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs of Mongolia and takes decisions on issues of within the Ministry’s competence or makes proposals to the 
Government of Mongolia or the National Security Council.
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of a more political nature that, in their view, could help Mongolia achieve its for-
eign policy objectives. The proposals were as follows:
First, Mongolia could table a resolution at the 1998 UN First Committee 
and General Assembly that would recognize the “permanent neutrality of 
Mongolia”, similar to the one that Turkmenistan had tabled in 1995 and 
which was adopted by consensus.
Second, an additional UNGA resolution could be tabled in 1999 that would 
urge greater cooperation and comity among the States of the region, 
a concept similar to that which had inspired a series of resolutions regard-
ing the development of good-neighborly relations among the Balkan States.
Third, Mongolia could conclude a border security treaty with its neigh
bors similar to the 1996 treaty concluded among Russia, China, Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The agreement could focus on transparency 
measures for conventional forces, including advance notification of ma-
neuvers, restrictions on the scale, geographical limits and the number of 
troop exercises, and an agreement that a party’s military forces would not 
be used to attack another party or conduct any military activity threatening 
the other party and thus upsetting calm and stability in the border area. 
Fourth. In the 1993 Mongolian-Russian treaty on friendly relations and 
cooperation, Russia officially committed itself to respect Mongolia’s policy 
prohibiting the stationing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion on its territory. Perhaps, Mongolia could also seek similar treaty-based 
recognition of its non-nuclear status from China. The P3 expressed the 
hope that the Mongolian side would consider these ideas and would 
respond soon. 
The Mongolian side thanked the P3 for the proposals which were indeed novel 
and interesting and enquired whether the Russians and Chinese were aware of 
these proposals. He was told that both Russia and China were aware of them. 
Thus, when the Chinese representative was told about the possible border treaty, 
the response was that China and Mongolia already had border and border regime 
treaties and that is why they did not have any border problems. When the P3 
inquired if that would indicate that conclusion of such a treaty was even more 
possible, the Chinese representative in principle agreed and promised to convey 
the P3 proposal to Beijing. As for the Russian side, Mongolia was told that it was 
supportive and had even expressed its readiness to co-sponsor these proposals. 
However, since China was not co-sponsoring it, it was thought not proper for 
Russia to co-sponsor without China, the P3 was told by Russia. 
The Mongolian representative thanked the P3 for their interesting proposals 
and promised to take them up at the forthcoming internal consultations in Ulaan-
baatar and to respond after the consultations. At the same time he made some 
brief preliminary comments regarding some of the points reflected in the propos-
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als. Thus, he asked what was meant by “permanent neutrality”, since Mongolia was 
pursuing in practice a policy of neutrality with respect to possible disputes among 
its two neighbors only. He said that in cases of imbalances in power and geo-
graphical handicaps, such as lack of independent access to the sea and markets, it 
was difficult to maintain a credible permanent neutral policy. Moreover, neutral-
ity could be more credible if it were based not on a political declaration but on an 
international agreement or treaty. As for Turkmenistan’s neutrality, he agreed that 
in 1995 the General Assembly had indeed approved a resolution that expressed 
support for that country’s declared permanent neutrality. However, General As-
sembly resolutions in themselves were not guarantees. Moreover, Turkmenistan’s 
neutrality resolution did not envisage any implementation nor verification mech-
anism. It would be another issue if neutrality would have an international legal 
basis, in which case he stated that Mongolia might be willing to seriously consider 
it The P3 responded that neutrality could start with the General Assembly resolu-
tion.
As for a border security treaty, the Mongolian representative said that his 
country had no territorial or border problems with its two neighbors; in fact it 
had border demarcation and border regime treaties with both of them, and there-
fore he saw no urgent need to conclude a border security treaty. He reiterated that 
Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status could be strengthened by first adopting in 
1998 a substantial General Assembly resolution that could in 1999 be followed-up 
by the conclusion of a trilateral treaty between China, Russia and Mongolia that 
would define the latter’s nuclear-weapon-free status, and in 2000 by the adoption 
of a second resolution in support of the trilateral treaty. 
The P3 indicated that they were aware of Mongolia’s policy, however they were 
still reluctant to support such action since that might set a precedent that might 
affect Japan and its policy, for example. That was precisely why the P3 was making 
the afore-mentioned four proposals. 
The representative of Mongolia underlined the importance of institutionaliz-
ing the status through concluding an international treaty. The P3 responded that 
they would be prepared to support a General Assembly resolution that they would 
be proposing and that in itself would amount to guaranteeing its implementation. 
In the end it was agreed that the Mongolian side would get back with an official 
reaction to the P-3 proposals sometime in August. 
d) decision of the Minister’s council 
The Minister’s council met on 3 July 1998 and, having heard the report of 
Mongolia’s Permanent Representative to the UN on the issue, agreed to promote 
Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status in three stages:  1) to have the General As-
sembly adopt in 1998 a resolution regarding Mongolia’s status that would wel-
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come its good-neighborly relations with Russia and China, call upon these three 
countries to conclude a treaty regarding Mongolia’s independence, sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and its nuclear-weapon free status and have the General As-
sembly welcome and support the status:  2) to work for a trilateral treaty in 1999 
and 2000 whereby Russia and China would commit to respect Mongolia’s inde-
pendence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, nuclear-weapon-free status, inviolabil-
ity of its frontiers, economic security and ecological balance; and  3) to work for 
the adoption by the General Assembly in 2000 of a resolution that would welcome 
the trilateral treaty between Mongolia, Russia and China and ask the General As-
sembly, the Security Council, and the Secretary General to assist in an appropriate 
manner in implementing the treaty. With this mandate, the Mongolian delegation 
went to the General Assembly to start working for its implementation. 
e) Response to the P3 four-point proposal
Based on the decision of the Minister’s council meeting, the Mongolian side, 
as a first step, sent the following response to the P3 regarding their four-point 
proposal in a form of a memorandum: 
“The Mongolian side has carefully studied the ideas presented by the P3 Am-
bassadors, in close consultation with the representatives of Russia and China, on 
12 June 1998 in Geneva in connection with Mongolia’s single-State NWFZ con-
cept. Mongolia believes that the P3 proposals are a positive indication that the US, 
UK and France, like Russia and China, fully understand and support its desire to 
seek international recognition of its unique political and security situation and 
institutionalize it as such.  The ideas put forward by the P3 (permanent neutrality 
of Mongolia, good-neighborly relations with Russia and China and conclusion of 
a border security treaty with them) are a vivid manifestation thereof.  
Being a small State sandwiched by two nuclear neighbors, Mongolia is gen-
uinely interested in safeguarding its non-nuclear status which would be in the 
interests of Mongolia as well as its neighbors, especially in their strategic calcula-
tions and hence for the predictability and stability of the region. 
Mongolia has declared its territory a NWFZ, which enjoys the broadest sup-
port of the international community, including of the P5. The next logical step for 
Mongolia is to have the General Assembly recognize and support the status, as it 
has done with respect to other zones, since the Assembly itself has declared as far 
back as in 1975 that the nuclear-weapon-free zones …“shall, as a rule, be recog-
nized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations. ”However, we are 
aware that though the P5 understand and support Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-
free status, the single-State NWFZ concept at present causes difficulties for the 
P5 if applied in other circumstances. Therefore they are prepared to deal with 
Mongolia’s case as an exception.
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Bearing in mind Mongolia’s foreign policy orientation, its good-neighborly 
relations with the two neighbors and the position of the P5 with respect to Mon-
golia’s case as well as the single-State NWFZ concept, the Mongolian side is pro-
posing the following: 
First, Mongolia agrees with the three step approach to addressing this 
question, namely the adoption by the 53rd General Assembly of a resolu-
tion on Mongolia’s international security status (in order not to emphasize 
solely the NWFZ status), conclusion with its neighbors of a trilateral treaty 
that would address the external security related issues of Mongolia and a 
second resolution after the trilateral treaty has been concluded. 
Second, this year Mongolia could table, as agreed in principle, a resolu-
tion in the First Committee that would welcome and recognize Mongolia’s 
nuclear-weapon-free status; take note of the importance of this status for 
enhancing stability in the region as well as for strengthening Mongolia’s 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; welcome Mongolia’s 
good-neighborly and balanced relationship with its neighbors; invite Mon-
golia’s neighbors as well as other nuclear-weapon States to cooperate with it 
in institutionalizing its nuclear-weapon-free status as an important basis of 
its national security and call upon all States to respect Mongolia’s status. A 
draft resolution to this effect is annexed to this memorandum. 
Third, Mongolia could conclude a treaty of a general political nature with 
its neighbors on its security and nuclear-weapon-free status. Many of the 
provisions of the treaty could be drawn from the treaties of friendly rela-
tions and cooperation that Mongolia has concluded with its neighbors sep-
arately in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Since the treaty would deal to some 
extent with Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, perhaps the P3 could 
express their support for the treaty in one form or another (protocol, joint 
declaration).
Fourth, the General Assembly, perhaps at its 55th session, could welcome 
the conclusion of the treaty and its support by the P3 mentioned above and 
call upon all States to respect and support Mongolia’s status.”
The draft resolution that was annexed to the Mongolian response differed very 
little from the non-paper presented to P5 Ambassadors in April (as reproduced as 
Annex 3). The only major difference was that the title of the resolution would have 
read “Mongolia’s security and nuclear-weapon-free status”. 
Negotiating the text of the first resolution
a) Response to Mongolia’s draft resolution
The written response of the United States to Mongolia’s ambitious draft resolu-
tion mentioned above, which had been annexed to the Mongolia’s memorandum 
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regarding the P3 proposals, came on  23 September. It was an extensive response, 
harsh and critical. It said that the preambular paragraph, including references to 
NWFZ, needed to be reduced and quotation marks be added to “nuclear-weapon-
free zones” so as to make it clear that that was Mongolia’s characterization of itself, 
and not a recognized NWFZ. Reference to “sound international legal basis” need-
ed to be deleted since it was not clear what was meant by it. Likewise, reference 
to verifiability of the status needed to be deleted since, as it stood, it could have 
implied a more extensive system of verification other than that already conducted 
by the IAEA. 
With regard to the operative part, the US response suggested that reference 
to “institutionalization” needed to be defined as institutionalizing its nuclear-
weapon-free status through appropriate declarations of support and to refrain 
from taking actions inconsistent with Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status. It 
was emphasized that the US did not support creating new international “institu-
tions” (i.e. agencies, organizations, implementing bodies or procedures requir-
ing international actions) that would expressly support Mongolia’s self-declared 
nuclear-weapon-free status. It was also unclear, the US said, from the grammati-
cal construction whether “other nuclear-weapon States” was synonymous with 
“Mongolia’s neighbors” or meant the P3 as well.  The US thought that operative 
paragraph 6, which would have requested the Secretary General and relevant 
UN bodies to extend the necessary assistance to Mongolia in institutionalizing 
and sustaining its status, needed to be either deleted entirely or, alternatively, the 
phrase “within existing resources and without prejudice to existing UN commit-
ments, obligations and priorities” needed to be added after “necessary assistance”. 
Even in that case US would still be concerned over the meaning of the terms 
“institutionalization” and “sustaining”.  What did Mongolia mean by “institution-
alization”, US asked. In general, this would imply creating some institution for 
implementation, oversight etc.
A few days later, on 29 September, without waiting for Mongolia’s response to 
the written comments presented above regarding the latter’s draft resolution, the 
United States conveyed its own preliminary ideas in the form of a draft resolution 
based, it said,, on the Mongolian draft. The main difference was that in the opera-
tive part of the US draft, the General Assembly, instead of ‘recognizing and sup-
porting’ Mongolia’s status,  would only ‘take note’ of the declaration by Mongolia 
of its nuclear-weapon-free status, and instead of ‘inviting’ Mongolia’s neighbors 
and other  nuclear-weapon States to cooperate with it in institutionalizing the sta-
tus’, it would merely ‘ask member States to emphasize their respect for Mongolia’s 
status’. There were other drafting changes as well.
Before Mongolia had the chance to formally react to the US proposal, the P3 
met separately and decided to produce their joint draft resolution (the United 
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States and France were to tasked to draft it).  The new P3 draft was soon commu-
nicated to the Mongolian side.
On 2 October, the US and Mongolian representatives met to update each other 
on the latest developments and exchange views of the possible common draft res-
olution. The United States once again expressed its opposition to the idea and the 
use of the term “institutionalization”.  Mongolia explained that institutionalization 
did not necessarily mean establishing new institutions but rather meant laying 
the legal basis for Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status. The two sides agreed to 
disagree on this issue. They agreed also to speed-up the drafting of the resolution 
and, if possible, to finalize it before the Mongolian representative would make his 
statement in the First Committee on 14 October 1998 and indicate his govern-
ment’s position on the issue. The United States informed that though both Russia 
and China were aware of the drafting work underway, neither would participate 
in the actual drafting, since they believed that they had already expressed their 
views on Mongolia’s status and that if they would participate in the negotiations 
together with the P3 their policy might look inconsistent. 
The Mongolian side learned on 13 October that the P5 Ambassadors had met 
and decided to present their joint (not P3 but P5) draft in the next days. As to the 
actual drafting, Russia said that it needed instructions from Moscow, while China 
declared that it would support but not participate in the drafting itself.  
b) P5 joint draft resolution
On 16 October 1998, the United States presented to Mongolia two draft reso-
lutions:  version A co-sponsored by United States, United Kingdom, Russia and 
France; and version B, a possible counterproposal by Mongolia. The A version was 
almost a reproduction of the earlier US version of the draft resolution except that 
Russia was co-sponsoring it as well, while reference to inviting member States to 
emphasize their respect for Mongolia’s status had been deleted. It meant that the 
gist of the resolution would be to ‘take note’ of Mongolia’s declaration instead of 
‘recognizing’ and ‘supporting’ the NWFZ status. Any reference to institutionaliza-
tion was also absent.  Therefore, version A was a priori unacceptable for Mongolia. 
The P4 anticipated Mongolia’s negative reaction to version A and therefore they 
had prepared a “more acceptable” one for Mongolia – a version B.
Version B was also more or less a reproduction of version A, but contained 
three main differences. One was that the operative part, instead of ‘taking note’ of 
Mongolia’s declaration, would ‘welcome’ it. Two other novelties were additional 
operative paragraphs that would invite Russia and China “to cooperate with Mon-
golia in taking the necessary measures trilaterally to consolidate and strength-
en Mongolia’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of its 
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frontiers, nuclear-weapon-free status, ecological balance and non-aligned foreign 
policy” and requested the Secretary General and relevant UN bodies to provide 
the necessary assistance to Mongolia, within existing resources, to take the neces-
sary measures enumerated above.
Version B of the draft resolution was a step in the direction of officially ac-
knowledging Mongolia’s initiative and placing emphasis on trilateral measures to 
promote it (in line with Mongolia’s goal of concluding a trilateral treaty with its 
neighbors on defining its nuclear-weapon-free status). However, since the resolu-
tion would be the first that would pave the way for other subsequent resolutions 
(in case such resolutions would be needed) Mongolia believed that its major in-
terests were not adequately reflected in version B. That is why Mongolia took the 
initiative of producing a version C based on its own original draft and some provi-
sions of version B.
c) Negotiating version C 
The main gist of the new Mongolian draft (version C) was to have General 
Assembly welcome the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status 
and invite its two neighbors to cooperate with it in consolidating and strengthen-
ing the status (as indirectly implied by in operative paragraph 3 of version B). 
Mongolia also used the draft to revive some of its previous proposals, such as 
recalling the separate Statements of support for Mongolia’s initiative made by the 
P5, underlining that nuclear-weapon-free status was one of the means of ensuring 
national security of states and expressing the conviction that Mongolia’s inter-
nationally recognized status would contribute to enhancing stability and confi-
dence-building in the region. Although version B placed emphasis on trilateral 
cooperation, it did not envisage any role for the P3. That is why the Mongolian 
draft called upon other nuclear-weapon states (meaning the P3) and the entire 
UN membership to respect and support the status. 
Version C was presented to the P5 on 19 October for their consideration. Rus-
sia asked for some time (2-3 days) to carefully study the draft and consult with 
Moscow. Though China was supportive of the draft, it wondered why the draft 
laid so much emphasis on Mongolia’s two neighbors, and proposed to invite not 
only Russia and China but all P5 to cooperate with Mongolia. In that spirit it sug-
gested deleting the request to the Secretary General to assist in the trilateral coop-
eration. China also saw no need to call upon Member States to respect Mongolia’s 
status since it was obvious from the spirit of the draft in the first place. Mongolia 
agreed in principle with the comments and promised to bear them in mind when 
working further on the draft. 
With most of the provisions of the draft resolution agreed with the P5 in prin-
ciple, the operative paragraph 3 which dealt with the trilateral cooperation be-
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came the focus of real negotiation. Thus, the United States proposed deleting any 
mention of the P5 and instead suggested to call upon all members of the UN 
to cooperate with Mongolia.  In response, Mongolia underlined that in a larger 
context the issue was related to nuclear weapons and thus to the P5 as permanent 
members of the Security Council. Therefore, it argued, the P5 should be men-
tioned, if not in operative paragraph 3, and suggested to call upon the “interested 
States”. During subsequent drafting, Mongolia deleted references to trilateral co-
operation both in operative paragraph 3 and in the paragraph that would have 
requested the Secretary General to provide assistance, so as to reduce the dif-
ficulties that these paragraphs could cause Russia and China at that stage. With 
these changes the draft was finally submitted to UN Secretariat for circulation as 
a working document of the First Committee (the draft appeared on 23 October 
1998 as document A/C.1/53/L.10). 
After circulation of the draft resolution L.10, the United States suggested that 
in operative paragraph 3 the term “interested States” needed to be changed to 
“States concerned” since, depending on their geographical location, nuclear-
weapon states played different roles. Since there was no other major problem with 
the rest of the draft resolution, the Mongolian side agreed to the suggestion. With 
this change the draft resolution was re-issued as document L.10/Rev.1.
The draft resolution L.10/Rev.1 was introduced by Mongolia in the First Com-
mittee on 29 October 1998. The Mongolian representative underlined that this was 
a product of long serious consultations and delicate negotiations. It was pointed 
out that for a small state with Mongolia’s geopolitical location, its status would be 
stronger and more durable if its overall security were to be internationally recog-
nized and guaranteed. That understanding formed the basis of the very concept 
of the draft resolution and of the  approach to the question in general. Looking to 
the future, he said that with such understanding and the necessary political will 
it would be possible to arrive soon at a concrete, special arrangement that could 
accommodate both the particular needs and interests of Mongolia and the legiti-
mate interests of its neighbors and of stability in the region in general. He pointed 
out that the soul of the resolution was its operative paragraph 3 which proceeded 
from the notion that its nuclear-weapon-free status was part of Mongolia’s overall 
security and that therefore consolidation and strengthening of its international 
security was a sine qua non for ensuring its nuclear-weapon-free status. Therefore 
that operative paragraph would invite all “States concerned” to cooperate with 
Mongolia in that regard. 
After the draft had been introduced, the Chinese delegate approached the 
Mongolian delegation with a list of proposed last minute changes to the draft, 
which he read out. When asked whether these proposals could be made formal-
ly in a written form since the draft resolution had already been circulated and 
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introduced in the First Committee, he said that these were only oral proposals 
for Mongolia to think about. Thus, he suggested to change operative paragraph 3 
that referred to “States concerned” to “Member States, including the five nuclear-
weapon states” so as to make sure that all of the P5 would be asked to cooperate 
with Mongolia. He also proposed to reflect in the preambular part a reference to 
the five principles of peaceful coexistence, delete the preambular paragraph that 
underlined the importance of an internationally recognized status of Mongolia, 
and in the  operative part to delete all the paragraphs except for the ones that 
would welcome Mongolia’s declaration of its nuclear-weapon-free status, ask the 
Secretary General to report on the implementation of the resolution and inclu-
sion of the item in the provisional agenda of one future General Assembly session. 
Sensing that China was not insisting on its proposals, Mongolia agreed only to the 
change to be made in operative paragraph 3, and later that day asked the Secre-
tariat to make that change and issue the document as L.10/Rev.2.  
d) A flurry of proposed amendments to the revised draft
With document L.10/Rev.2 circulated among delegates and just a few days 
before its official re-introduction in the First Committee, China and France be-
came unusually active in proposing changes to the draft. Thus, France proposed 
in the preambular part to delete the gist of NAM’s support for Mongolia’s initia-
tive (which referred to institutionalization of the single-State nuclear-weapon-
free status). It also proposed to delete in the operative part of the draft a reference 
to the P5 as well as any reference to a follow-up report by the Secretary General 
and to the inclusion of the item in any future provisional agenda of the General 
Assembly. 
China proposed five changes in the draft: in the preambular part to add one 
paragraph that would note with appreciation Mongolia’s reaffirmation of its de-
termination to honor the obligations that it had undertaken under the NPT and 
delete in the preambular part the provisions that would underline the importance 
of Mongolia’s internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free status and made 
reference to Mongolia’s security interests. In the operative part it proposed that 
some minor drafting changes be made concerning Mongolia’s relations with its 
neighbors. It also proposed to add a new paragraph that would read as follows: 
“Welcomes the undertaking by Mongolia as a member of the NPT not to receive 
the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control 
over such weapons or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, 
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices” (a quote from Article II of the NPT). 
Faced with a barrage of last-minute proposals that needed some form of re-
action or response, the Mongolian delegation drew up its own counterproposal 
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which  inter alia, underlined that establishment of NWFZs could contribute to the 
achievement of general and complete disarmament, emphasized the importance 
of internationally recognized agreements on the establishment of NWFZs and 
in an operative part urged the states concerned, especially the nuclear-weapon 
states, pending the establishment of the zone, to take appropriate measures to 
strengthen Mongolia’s status. These written counterproposals of Mongolia were 
communicated to France and China, which played their role in “restraining” the 
other two “last minute enthusiasts” to press their proposed amendments.  These 
last-minute changes, if debated, could have delayed the consideration of the draft 
resolution and action on it in the First Committee, since the deadline for submit-
ting draft resolutions and taking action on them was quickly approaching. 
When the date of the introduction of L.10/Rev.2 and taking action on the draft 
had been set, first Japan, then China and India asked for time-out to consult with 
their capitals. On 10 November the Mongolian representative introduced L.10/
Rev.2 in the Committee. He said that Mongolia and its negotiating partners had 
approached the issue creatively and mindful of the prevailing political realities. 
As a result of the consultations held since October 1997, it had been agreed that 
Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status would be credible and durable only if its 
over-all security were ensured and internationally recognized. He pointed out 
that this understanding had formed the basis of the very concept and the spirit 
of the approach of the states concerned to it, and had been reflected in the draft 
resolution. 
Explaining the need for the second revision, the Mongolian delegate pointed 
out that it was connected with a request by one of the “States concerned” to make 
it absolutely clear that all five nuclear-weapon states would be equally involved, 
and that this emphasis had found reflection in the sole change that had been made 
in operative para 3, where the words “States concerned” had been replaced by the 
words “Member States, including the five nuclear-weapon states”.
e) Adoption of the resolution
During the consideration of the draft resolution in the First Committee, Paki-
stan’s Ambassador (who thought that the Committee was in the process of adopt-
ing another draft resolution dealing with nuclear testing in which Pakistan and 
India were being blamed) has asked for a 10-minute delay in the adoption of the 
decision. The Mongolian delegation was taken by surprise and wondered whether 
one of the P5 was behind the move. However, having been told that the resolution 
dealt with Mongolia’s draft, Pakistan withdrew its request for the delay. 
The draft resolution was adopted on 10 November 1998 without a vote (see 
Annex-4). Explanations of vote (EOV) were made by Australia, Canada, Chili, 
China, Egypt Jamaica, Macedonia, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, San Marino, and 
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the United States.
Of the delegates that made EOVs, of particular interest were the EOVs of Chi-
na and of the United States.
The Chinese delegate pointed out that he understood and supported the de-
sire and efforts of Mongolia to establish a single nuclear-weapon-free state status 
and that China would respect and support such a status. He underlined that as a 
neighbor of Mongolia, China fully respected the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Mongolia and supported its independent foreign policy. 
Ambassador Grey of the United States pointed out that the political coopera-
tion which the resolution called for was expected to lead to significant interna-
tional security benefits for Mongolia as well as for the states that participated in 
the process. He underlined that the United States had supported the resolution 
because Mongolia’s unique geographic and security situation merited unique con-
sideration. He said that he wanted to correct a misperception that the resolution 
called for the establishment of a single-state NWFZ. He said that a close examina-
tion of the text would reveal that Mongolia had moved beyond such a concept and 
was looking to a broader range of measures to increase its international security, 
and that this broader approach would yield important security benefits for Mon-
golia and for the international community.
On 4 December 1998 the plenary of the General Assembly considered the re-
port of the First Committee and took action on the proposed resolutions and a 
decision. The draft resolution regarding Mongolia’s status was adopted without 
a vote. In taking the floor to explain its vote and the importance of the resolu-
tion, the Mongolian delegate expressed optimism regarding future practical steps, 
explaining that this optimistic view was based on the good-neighborly relations 
and cooperation that Mongolia enjoyed with all states, and especially with its two 
neighbors, both of which had concluded treaties on friendly relations and coop-
eration with Mongolia. In a broader context, he underlined, bearing in mind the 
weight that these  two neighbors and other nuclear-weapon states had in interna-
tional relations, a well-balanced set of arrangements could play an important role 
in enhancing further stability in that strategic region.
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to shed some light on the amount of work that was 
needed to promote Mongolia’s initiative and have the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopt its first resolution regarding Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-
free status. The author tried to show that good will, cooperation and a joint search 
for acceptable compromise can yield positive outcomes.  Multilateral diplomacy is 
a tool that can bring large and small states together to address common issues and 
challenges. Competition and cooperation are two sides of multilateral diplomacy. 
However, on the other hand, the negotiations also showed that when it comes to 
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nuclear issues, even if they did not deal with any nuclear threat but were intended 
to contribute to mutual trust, the P5 are still often hesitant to move beyond Cold 
War mindsets and are usually hesitant to entertain or accept fresh ideas and initia-
tives.
The first General Assembly resolution on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free sta-
tus was a landmark in Mongolia’s quest for credible security assurances. It paved 
the way for pursuing the issue within a multilateral framework. The resolution 
invited Member States, including the P5, to work with Mongolia “to … consoli-
date … its nuclear-weapon-free status”. In response to that ‘invitation’, in 2000 the 
P5 made a Joint Statement on providing security assurances to Mongolia in con-
nection with its nuclear-weapon-free status. Although it might sound impressive, 
what the P5 did was merely to announce that their non-binding, highly caveated 
declarations on security assurances to NPT non-nuclear weapon states … applied 
to Mongolia. For Mongolia,  which was successfully developing good-neighborly 
relations with Russia and China, it was “surprising” to be given P4 assurances 
which announced the … conditions under which nuclear weapons would not be 
used or threatened to be used against it. This Joint Statement clearly demonstrated 
that still much more needed to be done to acquire the security assurances tailored 
to Mongolia’s specific geopolitical conditions. On the other hand, China con-
firmed its well-know general strategic position that it would not use or threaten 
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or NWFZs at any time 
or under any circumstances.
The reader might be tempted to ask what Mongolia really wanted to gain from 
its initiative. The Cold War years had vividly demonstrated to Mongolia that, just 
like other small states with a nuclear-weapon-state neighbor it could be drawn 
into a possible nuclear stand-off between nuclear-weapon states and thus “be tar-
geted” by various pressures to accept elements of nuclear-weapon systems or serve 
as a potential accomplice “in association or alliance” with a nuclear-weapon state. 
In reality, Mongolia is not a party to any political-military alliance or grouping, 
nor does it want to be. The best way for Mongolia to ensure its security, and thus 
contribute to regional peace and understanding, is by promoting further good-
neighborly relations with Russia and China and, bearing in mind its geopolitical 
circumstances, by developing a special regime that would recognize Mongolia’s 
neutrality in great power rivalries or disputes. Such a regime, which could be 
based on Mongolia’s internationally defined and recognized nuclear-weapon-free 
status, could, as Mongolia had suggested, consist of a trilateral treaty with its im-
mediate neighbors as mentioned in this article, a P3 protocol to that treaty in its 
support, and an overwhelming international support in the form of a General 
Assembly resolution. 
The twelve years since the adoption of the first General Assembly resolution, 
especially the results of the NPT Review conferences amply demonstrate that the 
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cold war mindset is still prevalent and, therefore, it would take enormous efforts, 
persistence and, what is more important,  courage and political will to move to-
wards a safer world. Thus it took enormous efforts on the part of Mongolia and 
twelve more years for the P5 to finally recognize Mongolia’s status and provide 
assurances to respect that status and not to contribute to any act that would vio-
late it. It will still take more efforts to duly institutionalize the status and make an 
important part of the emerging XXI nuclear security architecture.  
                  Vienna, December 2012
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Annex-1
U.S. statement of 6 October 1993
The Government of the United States commends the Government of Mon-
golia on its demonstrated adherence to the principles of the 1968 Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear Weapons, to which Mongolia and the United 
States are parties, and on its decision in this spirit to declare Mongolia a nuclear-
weapon-free zone.  In this connection, we also welcome Mongolia’s decision to 
support the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.
In adhering closely to the letter and spirit of the NPT, Mongolia, as a non-nu-
clear sovereign State friendly to the United States, benefits from the United States’ 
commitment to seek Security Council assistance for non-nuclear-weapon States 
who are members of the NPT in the event of a nuclear attack on them, and from 
U.S. assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear State 
not allied with a nuclear-weapon State. We note that other nuclear-weapon States 
have provided similar assurances.
  If Mongolia ever faces a threat and decides to refer the matter to the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council, the United States, along with other members of the 
Council, would consider appropriate steps to be taken.
Annex-2
Draft
JOINT STATEMENT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES
CONCERNING MONGOLIA’S DECLARATION OF
A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE
We, the undersigned nuclear-weapon States, 
Recognizing that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute 
to the strengthening of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to 
security of States,
Recognizing the importance of Mongolia’s declaration of her territory as a nu-
clear-weapon-free zone for strengthening confidence and predictability in Cen-
tral Asia, and in the Asia-Pacific region in general, 
Recalling the United Nations Security Council resolution of 19 June 1968 
concerning security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States as well as the uni-
lateral declaration by nuclear-weapon States concerning Mongolia’s declaration 
of her territory as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, aking into consideration Mongo-
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lia’s commitment not to produce, place or allow the stationing on her territory of 
nuclear weapons or their component parts, as well as her commitment to allow 
international inspections, 
Declare that we shall respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. If 
Mongolia ever faces a threat and decides to refer the matter to the United Nations 
Security Council, we, along with other members of the Council, would consider 
appropriate steps to be taken, as provided in the UN Charter. 
                                                                                          New York,  “      “ August 1994
Annex-3
Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status
(non paper by Mongolia, April 1998)
The General Assembly, 
Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations;
Recalling further the Declaration of Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations;
Recalling its relevant resolutions concerning the establishment of nuclear-
weapon-free zones, including paragraphs 60-62 of the Final Document of the 
Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to 
disarmament;
Recalling further its resolution 3472 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975 whereby it 
underlined that a nuclear-weapon-free zone shall, as a rule, be recognized as such 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations;
Welcoming the decision of Mongolia, located between two nuclear-weapon 
States, to declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone;
Taking note with satisfaction of the separate statements made by the nuclear-
weapon States in connection with Mongolia’s declaration of its territory a nuclear-
weapon-free zone;
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Bearing in mind the Final Document of the XII Ministerial Conference of 
the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries held in New Delhi n April of 1997, 
whereby it welcomed the efforts of Mongolia to institutionalize its nuclear-weap-
on-free status;
Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones 
and areas in various parts of the world are important means of contributing effec-
tively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and general and 
complete disarmament, as well as to ensuring the security of the concerned states;
Proceeding from the fact that nuclear-weapon-free status is one of the means 
of ensuring the national security of States;
Bearing in mind its resolution 49/31 of 9 December 1994 on the protection 
and security of small States;
Believing that the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia will contribute to 
enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region as well as promote 
Mongolia’s security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity, inviolability of its borders and preservation of its ecological balance;
Convinced that for the nuclear-weapon-free status to be credible it should have a 
sound international legal basis and be verifiable;
1. Recognizes and supports Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status;
2. Welcomes Mongolia’s good-neighborly and balanced relationship with  
  its neighbors as an important element of strengthening regional peace,  
  security and stability;
3. Invites Mongolia’s neighbors, other nuclear-weapon States to cooperate  
  with Mongolia in institutionalizing its nuclear-weapon-free status as an  
  important basis of its national security;
4. Calls upon States members of the United Nations to respect and sup 
  port Mongolia’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviola 
  bility of its frontiers and preservation of its ecological balance as well as  
  its non-aligned foreign policy;
5. Appeals to the member States of the Asia-Pacific region to support 
  Mongolia’s efforts to join the relevant regional security and economic 
  arrangements;
6. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies to  
  extend the necessary assistance to Mongolia in institutionalizing and 
  sustaining its nuclear-weapon-free status;
7. Requests further the Secretary-General to report on the 
  implementation of this resolution at its fifty-fourth session;
8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session
  an item entitled “Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status”. 
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Annex-4
MONGOLIA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE STATUS
(General Assembly resolution 53/77 D)
     The General Assembly,
Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations,
Recalling also the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations,23
Welcoming the decision of Mongolia to declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-
free zone,
Taking note with satisfaction of the separate statements made by the nuclear-
weapon States in connection with Mongolia’s declaration of its territory a nuclear-
weapon-free zone,  
Bearing in mind  the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of 
State or Government of Non-Aligned Counties, held at Durban, South Africa, 
from 29 August to 3 September 199824, in which the Conference welcomed and 
supported Mongolia’s policy to institutionalize its single State nuclear-weapon-
free status,
Proceeding from the fact that nuclear-weapon-free status is one of the means 
of ensuring the national security of States, 
Bearing in mind  its resolution  49/31 of 9 December 1994 on the protection 
and security of small States, Welcoming Mongolia’s active and positive role in de-
veloping peaceful, friendly  and mutually beneficial relations with the States of the 
region and other States,
Convinced  that the internationally recognized status of Mongolia will con-
tribute to enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region as well as 
promote Mongolia’s security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders and the preservation of its eco-
logical balance,
1. Welcomes  the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status;
2. Endorses and supports  Mongolia’s good-neighborly and balanced rela 
 tionship with its neighbors as an important element of strengthening
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24 A/53/667- S1998/1071, annex I; see official Records of the Security Council. Fifty-third Year, Supplement 
for October, November and December 1998 document S/1998/1071
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   regional peace, security and stability;
3. Invites Member States, including the five nuclear-weapon States, to  
 cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to 
 consolidate and strengthen Mongolia’s independence, sovereignty and  
 territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its economic security,  
 its ecological balance and its nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as its  
 independent foreign policy;
4. Appeals  to the member States of the Asia and Pacific region to support  
 Mongolia’s efforts to join the relevant regional security  and economic  
 arrangements;
5. Requests  the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations  bodies to  
 provide the necessary assistance to Mongolia, within existing resources,  
 to take the necessary measures mentioned in paragraph 3 above;
6. Requests  the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its  
 fifty-fifth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fifth session an  
 item entitled “Mongolia’s international security and 
 nuclear-weapon-free status”.  
79th plenary meeting
                                                                                                    4 December 1998
